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Abstract
The  current  crisis  has  led  to  interpretations  in  terms  of  models  of  organization  and
regulation of financial and banking system in each region and worldwide. Banking systems
in developed countries, characterized by diversity, concentration of financial intermediation
activities, enhancing restructuring operations, the availability for foreign relations will split
banking systems in two models: the banking systems of continental Europe, which are less
specialized  and  copied  on  the  American  model  bank  ,  applied  in  Japan,  based  on  the
principle of  strict  specialization of institutions. This article analyzes the banking systems
in Europe and the perspective from these systems.
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banking systems, settlement systems
The  current  crisis  has  led  to  many  interpretations  in  the  patterns  of
organization  and  regulation  of  the  banking  system  in  each  country,  region  and
globally.
Analyzing the institutional and regulatory framework in the U.S. the focus
of possible causes have been sufficient to trigger a global crisis, Nouriel Roubini
(Roubini et all., 2010) for example take the positive role models, such as the UK
Financial Services Authority, for the following reasons:
- takes care of regulating banks, insurance, securities, derivatives,
even mortgages;
- managers of various departments are under the same management
structure, which prevents arbitrage and compliance on all regulatory chosen.
A number of issues remain open, considers Roubini:
- the  paradox  of  choice  or  chosen  paradox  (regulation  of  the
chosen), a vicious circle which meets direct choise of the banks, gravitating to
agencies who promise the most least method rigorous regulatory and agencies will
see  their  remit  as  start  narrow,  and  a  regulator  is  not  regulating  because  loses
reason to be. Following reasons appear like a consequence for  "indulgence" so
regulators can attract more financial institutions in their sphere of influence;
- deliberate shift financial activity of organisational structures
from more strictly legislated in some less regulated, parallel banking system
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regulations should be applyed from one end to another system, all instituions that
raise not only seismic risk but even significant systematically financial firms. A
selective aplication of law would be a mistake because financial intermediation
will moove to many larger institutions and smaller institutions and regulated firms
to less regulated;
- reducing the principle of self regulation, the idea that regulators
can establish some general principles by which financial institutions can find their
way to comply. In addition any latitude of interpretation of the regulations should
not belong to market operators but should belong regulators.
Starting  on  the  above  ideas  to  meet  the  following  European  models  of
organization  of  banking  systems  we  can  find  next  classification:
Model 1 - Full Integration
This  model  features  a  full  institutional  integration  between  the  autority
prudential regulator prudential regulatory authority, central bank and the regulator
of securities markets. This model allows taking decisions for a complete set of
macro-prudential instruments by an internal committee of an organization, such as
for example the central bank's executive board and such decisions are fully binding
on the line throughout the market. For monetary policy decisions IMF recommends
a separate committee.
In  Europe,  the  Czech  Republic  has  long  been  the  only  example  of  full
integration.  Ireland  has  recently  made  the  transition  to  full  integration  model
abandoning the strong separation between central bank and the authority regulating
the  financial  integrity -  that  characterized  his  model.  Belgium  has  proposed
switching  to  this  model  during  2011  in  the  process  of  dismantling  the  macro-
prudential Council.
Model 2 - Partial Integration
This model is characterized by strong institutional integration between the
central  bank  and  prudential  regulatory  authority,  the  latter  as  a  department  or
branch/subsidiary  of  the  central  bank,  while the  securities  market  authority  is
separated from the central bank.
This  model  is  widespread  in  Europe,  but  there  are  differences  in  how
macro-prudential decisions are taken, there are three options at national level:
- the first approach - the governor of central bank presides over a
board comitee responsable for macro-prudential decisions, represented by central
bank  officials,  including  Supervisor  of  prudential  regulation  and  oversight,  and
coordinator of separate authority of the securities market. It is the direction towards
the model choosed by the UK and is going for Romania as chosen full model;
- the second approach - the above mentioned Comitee is not chaired
by central  bank  governor  but  by  the  Minister  of  Finance  /  Head  of  Treasury.
Applicable to countries like France, Greece, Italy and Portugal;
- the third approach, implies the coordination between regulators,
oversight is more  informal and there is no committee / board decisions responsableStudia Universitatis “Vasile Goldiş” Arad                                 Economics Series  Vol 22 Issue 3/2012
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for macro-prudential decisions. It is the case for the other European countries such
as Holland, which is based on strong institutional integration between central banks
and prudential regulators.
Model 3 - Separation / Segregation
In this model there is a separation between central banks and prudential
regulators and the securities market, the last two being sometimes integrated in one
regulatory authority. This segregation Favors decisions by consensus and further be
implemented  into  practice  the  recommendations  of  a  council.  Coordination  of
macro-prudential policy can sometimes involve the central bank. In other cases, in
practice,  the  separation  imposes  a  stronger  role  for  the  Ministry  of
Finance/Treasury who often occurs to mediate positions between different points of
view. In Europe there is no example of such a model, where policy coordination is
done by the central bank. Hungary, Poland, Denmark and Austria have recently
established a Council for macro-prudential decisions chaired by the Ministry of
Finance / Treasury. Estonia, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Latvia, Sweden do
not have any formal Council.
Integration of the Romanian banking system in the European banking
system
There are authors who say that money markets and government bond markets are
markets that integrates the fastest, yet few are evidence for a similar process for
integration of banking and particularly that of retail.
In assessing the state of integration of banking systems there have been
several approaches:
- direct  measurement  of  cross-border  operations  (especially  for
retail)  (Gual,  2004,  Perez et  all.,  2005) -  data  that  is  tracked  by  the  Bank  for
International Settlements. In general, these flows are less than 1% of total loans.
Although cross-border flows of retail are not a prerequisite for the integration of
banking systems, this level of this flux can be considered a premise of a weak
integration;
- addressing cross-border banking mergers (Kohler, 2007, Kohler,
2009) - actually defined by the absence of such offers in comparison to the number
of domestic mergers;
- another  approach  is  to  integrate  the  analysis  from  interest  rate
convergence study. Some authors (Adam et all. 2002) have analyzed this issue in
terms of corporate and mortgage loans, studying the convergence of interest rates
over a period of five years. Other authors (Affinito and Farabullini 2009) shows
that in the euro area "price" has higher dispersion than in Italy and concluded that
"the euro area prices appear different because national banking products appear
different or because they are differentiated by national factors". But some authorsStudia Universitatis “Vasile Goldiş” Arad                                 Economics Series  Vol 22 Issue 3/2012
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consider that dispersion in interest rates may be completely independent of banking
integration (Gropp et all. 2009);
- the  most  recent  approaches  analyzing  the  integration  are  those
considering the convergence of bank profitability (Gropp et all., 2009). In fact,
worldwide, some authors consider profitability and capitalization of banks not only
as a factor for integration but also tools that provide a stable and safe situation
(Blejer, 1998).
Common to these approaches is the concept of convergence. It can hold
two approaches:
- convergence  is  a  dynamic  process  which  is  based  on  the
application  of  socio-economic  policies  aimed  at  reducing  disparities  between
regions and countries in a given space. This can be done primarily through the
implementation of structural policies in order to achieve strong growth parameters
in the peripheral regions (so called not because of geographic location but through
the  endowment  with  economic  performance  factors  and  their  use)  which  have
undergone a decline economic or failed to achieve performance economic  of the
area they belong;
- addressing the increasing convergence by linking similarities and
economic performance of regional and national economies in a given space.
In most cases the convergence is seen as a precondition for integration,
because  as  long  as  structures  can  implement  policies  converge  the  integrative
process, its strategies and creating common functional institutions are more easily
achieved.
This convergence can be achieved in several ways, in 1995 Grossman and
Helpman  highlighted  the  role  of  integration  in  stimulating  economic  growth,
process where by elimination of barriers,  allows access of peripheral economies to
developed markets, and therefore eliminate the redundancy and make possible the
transfer of technologies and innovations from developed areas to the peripheral
areas.
Challenges of integration of banking systems
Clearly  evident during  the  last  four  years,  was  the  uncertainty  which
dominated the financial markets.
As such it can raise two major problems:
- contamination due to cross-border systemic risks but in parallel
with
- stability of national banking systems.
What  can  be  observed,  and  going  over  the  various  theories  is  that  the
banking and financial integration has advanced greatly in EU countries, especially
following the adoption of a common regulatory framework for banking, but which
led to greater interdependence between banking systems of many European Union
countries, which creates cross-border systemic risks much higher than in the past.Studia Universitatis “Vasile Goldiş” Arad                                 Economics Series  Vol 22 Issue 3/2012
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Based on those assumptions it is natural to put the question to what extent
we  can  discuss  about  the  stability  of the  Romanian  banking  system  in  the  EU
integration process.
A  stable  banking  system,  ensuring  effective  and  sustainable  national
economy mobilization of cash money, directing them towards efficient financial
activities, is an important precondition for economic development. The stability of
the  banking  system  is  much  more  visible  in  terms  of  financial  instability  and
banking  system  flaws,  vulnerability  to  changing  economic  environment,  hereby
banks and banking crises are more evident in similar periods as of recent crisis.
As is shown by the current crisis, financial stability plays a key role in the
financial system and economy as a whole. Given the increasing number of large
financial  institutions  currently  active  in  one  or  more  countries  or  one  or  more
continents, global financial stability has become even more important. Globally
considered (Nier, 2009) that the depth and extent of the financial crisis has given
new  impulses  to  authorities  to  rethink  existing  financial  stability  frameworks,
which should begin review of reconnecting with concrete financial objectives, this
showing a retrospect to collective failure and is necesary to find a solution to the
goal of reducing systemic risk.
Bank for International Settlements and the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision have jointly created in 1999 the Financial Stability Institute (FSI) to
assist financial sector supervisory authorities around the world in improving and
strengthening their financial systems.
FSI objectives are:
- to promote supervisory standards and practices globally to support
the implementation of these standards in all countries;
- to  provide  with  the  latest  market  information,  practices  and
techniques to oversight authorities, to help them adapt to rapid innovations in the
financial sector;
- to assist oversight authorities in developing solutions to multiple
challenges by sharing experiences in seminars, forums and conferences;
- to assist oversight authorities in hiring practices and provide tools
which will allow them to meet daily and tackle more ambitious objectives.
The main activities of FSI:
- organize  events  for  the  financial  sector  supervisory  authorities,
such as conferences, summits and seminars;
- provide  on-line  tools  (FSI  Connect),  learning  and  source  of
information for financial sector supervisors;
- Offer publications - occasional papers and a newsletter quarterly.
Considering that the first line of financial stability defense is given by the
international financial banking practice, one can raise two issues:
- how we define the banking system?;
- how do we ensure stability in financial stability?
The banking system is defined by some Romanian authors (Kiriţescu et
all.,  1998)  as  a  "banking  unit",  representing  all  the  operations  and  assets  andStudia Universitatis “Vasile Goldiş” Arad                                 Economics Series  Vol 22 Issue 3/2012
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liabilities  transactions  made  by  different  categories  of  the  bank,  with  private,
domestic capital or joint combinations of those, practicing within a country area.
Conclusions
Analyzing  banking  systems  in  developed  countries,  characterized  by
diversity,  concentration  of  financial  intermediation  activities,  enhanced
restructuring operations, the flexibility of communications with the Foreign, some
Romanian authors (Dardac et all., 2006) examine the banking systems in terms of
work  organization  of  bank  activity  and  degree  of  specialization,  distinguishing
between the two banking systems:
- banking systems of continental Europe, which are less specialized
and universal bank model works;
- american model, applied in Japan, based on the principle of strict
specialization of institutions.
The current crisis has amplified a rich debate about which system is more
viable European or American, putting into question the viability of the euro area in
its current form. Skeptics underlines the fragility of the euro area, including lack of
fiscal union and stating that a fully federal system like the U.S. could have helped
to  prevent  some  distinctive  features  of  the  crisis  in  the  euro  area  (eg
disproportionate level debt countries). Question remains whether this is evidence
that the euro is not viable without the federalism fiscal architecture (Harjes et all.,
2011)?
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